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ABSTRACT 
Health Systems Agencies (HSAs) were mandated to include 
representation of the community, broadly conceived. The 
implicit intention of the law was to include consumers as 
important and co-equal participants with providers in 
health planning. This paper is an examination of consumer 
participation in one HSA. Contrary to expectations derived 
from the literature, !citizens in this HSA exercised inde-
pendent judgment regarding the major issue to confront 
them. We conclude this was a function of the following: 
talents and skills of the consumer members; natural in-
terest in health care policy by consumer board members, 
sympathetic and supportive provider board members; and 
the homogenous character of the population in the region 
served. 
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s desirable as participation on the part of citizens in the 
decisions that effect them is, it is difficult in practice to 
bring about. Even where mechanisms for citizen participation are 
set up for this expressed purpose, the results typically fall short. 
This has been particularly true in the area of health planning, 
where Health Systems Agencies (HSAs) were to be the instrument 
for citizen participation. 
While the continued operation of HSAs is uncertain—the 
Reagan Administration has eliminated federal funding many of 
them are currently still in place. Only five states have actually 
abolished regional HSAs (7). However, health planning in the 
future may well include HSAs or something like them (7). In any 
case, it is quite likely that health planning will continue to be a 
major policy emphasis and that citizens, as consumers, will be 
involved in it in some way, even if it is only through local general 
purpose units of government. Therefore, we need to continue 
with research on the experience of citizens in health planning 
activities. In this paper, we review the experience of consumer 
members in health planning in one planning agency. Our thesis 
is that in at least one HSA, citizen participation succeeded to the 
degree that the consumer members on the HSA governing board 
were able to exercise judgments independent of provider mem-
bers on specific issues. In addition to documenting this, the 
analysis explores some factors that might account for it. Hope-
fully the research can serve as a basis for more broadly based 
inquiries into the factors that contribute to the success of citizen 
participation in health planning.  
Data come from personal interviews with and a survey of se-
lected board members, minutes of SeNHSA board and committee 
meetings, and interviews with HSA staff and others involved with 
the HSA concerning the major issue to come before it, the pro-
A
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posed expansion of a major hospital. While comments apply 
generally to the SeNHSA’s governing board, much of the analysis 
will deal with this issue. 
Theoretical Issues 
If citizen participation in the decisions that effect them means 
citizen power, as Sherry Arnstein (2) maintains, no one should 
be surprised at the difficulty, well documented in the literature, 
in bringing it about. Power is not something one group can have 
more of, unless, of course, another group has less. As power is 
quite obviously instrumental in achieving other goals, no group 
is likely to relinquish it willingly. 
Health planning through HSAs was, and it is, an experiment 
in citizen participation, where on the surface at least, citizens 
expanded their power at the expense of health care providers 
(doctors and hospitals) which have traditionally enjoyed a mo-
nopoly of power in the field. In terms of Arnstein’s ladder of 
citizen participation, HSAs permitted citizens, if not control, 
what she refers to as delegated power, a situation where citizens 
have a clear majority of seats on decision making boards and 
some specified power. This is to be contrasted with other lower 
forms of citizen participation which are labeled tokenism and 
nonparticipation. Here, the traditional power holders remain in 
control. 
While HSAs presented a genuine opportunity for citizens to 
exercise power, research on the operation of HSAs shows pro-
viders basically in control. A number of factors have been sug-
gested to explain provider dominance (6). First, it has generally 
been observed that consumer representatives on HSA boards 
lack knowledge of health care and health planning issues, leav-
ing them to decide issues on the basis of information provided 
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by professionals (13, 6), and, in general, in a way professions 
prefer (10). 
Second, many consumers are unwilling to get involved or ex-
ercise their prerogatives when they do become involved. Most 
consumers of health care have been socialized to believe that 
health policy is something to be left to professionals (9, 3). 
Those consumers willing to remain a part of the process often 
defer to the preferences of providers (1). 
Third, providers often are unwilling to share responsibility, 
undermining any meaningful role that consumers might play (8). 
Even staff with responsibility to upgrade the capacity of con-
sumer board members in health planning matters may view 
consumer participation as an unwelcome intrusion (13) . 
Fourth, consumers also often lack specific ties to the commu-
nity or organizations within the community which limit the ex-
tent to which they will challenge the well organized and often 
cohesive health care establishment (14, 12). While providers are 
backed and spurred on by the institutions they represent, con-
sumers are loose, unattached individuals who appear to be go-
ing it alone. 
Fifth, there is also the problem of discerning just what the 
role of the consumer member is supposed to be, planner or 
advocate of community interests (4). Inability to resolve these 
mutually exclusive roles often leads consumers to follow the line 
of least resistance, acquiescing to the demands of providers. 
Provider dominance need not, however, be the inevitable 
outcome on HSA boards. While research has described the ac-
tivities on the part of citizens in HSAs (5, 11), there has been 
little or no research focusing on decision making and the role 
played by consumer members in it. An assessment of consumer 
activities requires an examination of the decision making proc-
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ess. The research that follows attempts this with the most 
significant issue to come before the Southeast Nebraska Health 
Systems Agency. 
Background Information 
SeNHSA encompasses a seventeen county region and includes 
a major urban area, the City of Lincoln (approximate population 
170,000). Its board of directors numbers 33, 17 of which are 
consumers. Consumer members were recommended by local 
civic leaders, who were free to nominate themselves, and se-
lected by the county commissioners in each county. In Lincoln, 
Lancaster County, selection was by the city-county common, the 
city council and county commission combined. Each county was 
entitled to select a number of directors equal to the county’s 
proportion of population in the 17 county region. Selection was 
consistent with federal regulations requiring representation of 
demographic groups. 
In October 1980, one of Lincoln’s three major hospitals, 
Bryan Memorial, submitted a plan to expand its facilities to pro-
vide more and presumably better cardiac, general surgical, and 
emergency treatment. The hospital estimated the cost at $55 
million, $35 million to be financed from the sale of revenue 
bonds. The proposed expansion included facilities to train 
nurses, facilities for rehabilitation including a track and a swim-
ming pool, hotel type facilities for the families of patients, addi-
tional parking space, and an expanded physical plant for sup-
plying energy. While nobody questioned the need for some im-
provement in the oldest hospital in the community, debate 
concerned the extent or degree of improvement. 
SeNHSA reviewed the proposal and recommended the state 
issue a certificate of need. SeNHSA*s Project Review Committee 
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was principally involved in evaluating the proposal. Its delibera-
tions lasted until April, 1981. 
INDEPENDENCE OF CONSUMER MEMBERS 
Our thesis is that the consumer members of SeNHSA’s gov-
erning board exercised independent judgment. By independ-
ence, we do not mean that consumer members were uninflu-
enced by others involved in the process (providers and staff), 
only that they were not led by or dictated to by others. A deci-
sion contrary to the preferences of providers and staff would, of 
course, be clear evidence of independence. In addition to deci-
sion outcomes, independence can also be determined from the 
assessments of those involved in the process. When recon-
structing decision-making processes in search of motivations 
for actions, perceptions by those involved are imperfect but 
good proximate indicators. In the following analysis, both deci-
sions as well as assessments of those involved are examined. 
Independence from Providers 
An important test of the independence of consumers is their 
independence from providers. If consumers merely follow the 
lead of provider members, they have no effective voice. To as-
sess the influence of consumer members of SeNHSA several 
board members, HSA staff, and others involved with the Bryan 
expansion were asked in a focused interview format if consumer 
members were active as independent spokesmen in the delib-
erations of the board. 
The evidence suggests that they were. While some expressed 
concern that consumer board members followed the lead of the 
providers on the board and had no conception that providers 
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might do something not in the consumer’s interest, most of 
those interviewed expressed sentiments that contradicted this. 
For example, most pointed out that the consumer members on 
the board were very vocal, more so than providers. Consumer 
members were so vocal that one provider member claimed that 
the board was slanted toward consumers. This vocalness ap-
parently reflected disagreement, as this same person recalled 
several recommendations from provider members that were ig-
nored by the consumers on the board. Another board member 
referred to the “very vociferous consumer members.” This ten-
dency to speak out resulted in several consumer members being 
sought out by the press for interviews. 
A non board member but a person who was heavily involved 
in the Bryan issue identified some consumer members as “super 
consumers.” He elaborated that they were well trained and edu-
cated and able to hold their own in discussions. He indicated 
that they were willing to take a position and argue persuasively 
for it. Likewise, a staff member found the consumers on the 
board to be persuasive and willing to take a position. Another 
interviewee identified the exchanges between consumer and 
provider members as informative. Providers, he noted, were 
forced to defend their policies and programs. 
Several of those interviewed pointed out that some consumer 
members emerged as leaders on the board. One, in particular, 
was identified as very influential. One board member reflected 
that in a small group individuals with special training and skills 
are accorded respect and some degree of deference. Two con-
sumer members, one with a background in economics and the 
other in business were, thus, able to establish themselves as 
leaders and play a dominant role in proceedings. 
Participation and Independence of Consumers in a HSA 
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Themes which emerged from the focused interviews were 
also evident in responses to questionnaire items submitted to 
each member of the governing board. Of the 31 members, nine 
were returned from the 17 consumer members and seven from 
the provider members. Respondents were asked to evaluate the 
following statements: providers dominate policy and planning, 
consumers defer to providers, and consumer members play 
strong leadership roles in the agency. With respect to the con-
sumer members, four disagreed with the first statement and one 
strongly disagreed. Three of these served on the Project Review 
Committee and may have been in the best position to judge this. 
Three strongly agreed with the statement and one failed to re-
spond. With respect to the item, consumers defer to providers, 
three disagreed, two strongly, and three agreed. again, one 
failed to respond. Four agreed with the statement that consumer 
board members play strong leadership roles in the agency; two 
failed to respond, and three disagreed. Among providers, one 
strongly agreed and another agreed that providers dominate, 
however, two strongly disagreed and three disagreed. With re-
spect to consumer deference, four disagreed and two strongly 
disagreed. Regarding consumer board members play strong 
leadership roles in the agency, two strongly agreed. Three others 
agreed, and one disagreed. These responses do not convey an 
image of consumer acquiescence and passivity but of participa-
tion and quality. They also indicate some consumer leadership 
on the board. While we recognize the limitations of assessments 
on the part of those involved, these data, if they do not allow us 
to confirm the thesis of consumer independence, certainly per-
mit us to reject the idea of provider dominance. 
There remains, however, the question of outcome. How did 
the HSA treat the proposal? We have already pointed out that the 
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board recommended approval of the certificate of need, but 
there is more to it than this. For example, it was in response to 
consumer initiatives that Bryan officials modified their original 
proposal. Following the first public hearing several members of 
the Project Review Committee listed several items of concern 
regarding the hospital’s proposal. One of the committees con-
cerns was whether services at the hospital would duplicate those 
offered by a professional care center nearby. Subsequently, the 
proposal was rewritten to eliminate possible duplication At one 
point in the proceedings, the entire proposal was withdrawn in 
order to eliminate items objected by the Project Review Com-
mittee. For example, a proposed kitchen (part of rehabilitation 
training), swimming pool and track (both included in rehabilita-
tion facilities), were deleted. Constraints were placed on financ-
ing as well. Interest on the revenue bonds were not to exceed a 
specified level. This has remained a problem for Bryan Hospital. 
To date, the interest ceiling has made it very difficult to sell the 
bonds. Currently, the hospital is appealing to a gubernatorial 
appointed board to have this limitation lifted. 
It is clear that the Bryan proposal did not move through the 
review process quickly or smoothly. It is also clear that changes 
were brought about as a result of review and that these were re-
lated to the cost cutting concerns of the HSA. 
All of this, however, does not mean that the best interests of 
the citizens of the community were served. While this may be 
true, some factors need to be considered. First, consumers on 
the board were not elected, and did not represent well defined 
constituencies. They were selected because they were part of or 
thought to represent particular demographic classifications. 
Second, the community at large in southeast Nebraska or parts 
therein are, to be sure, not organized around or exercised by 
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health care issues. We can say, however, that the board, if noth-
ing else, recognized their role of checking health care costs. To 
the extent that this served the community’s interest, the com-
munity interest was represented. 
Although their final action was to recommend approval of the 
plan submitted by Bryan, the evidence suggests that the con-
sumer members acted independently of providers both on and 
off the board. Nor was the process dominated by providers* in-
formation or as a result of their expertise. 
Independence from Staff 
HSA staff are generally professional health care planners. 
Their function, among other things, is to train and educate 
board members regarding general issues in health care planning 
as well as inform them regarding the merits from the perspective 
of the community’s overall plan, of specific provider proposals. 
As a result, staff can exercise considerable influence over board 
members, particularly consumer representatives, who may be, to 
a large extent, unfamiliar and uneducated with respect to health 
care issues. The opportunity is present, to be sure, for staff to 
manipulate board members. This need not be conspiratorial or 
even conscious. We can assess the role of staff in this regard by 
examining how board members responded to staff recommen-
dations. Rather than isolating consumer members, the analysis 
in this section will examine the relationship between staff and 
the board in general. In all of the specifics discussed, consumers 
and providers acted in unison vis a vis staff. Did they accept, 
modify or reject them? While acceptance will not necessarily 
mean manipulation, modification or rejection will certainly be 
evidence for the board’s independence from the staff. We can 
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also explore how the board related to the staff as revealed in 
interview materials. 
With respect to the Bryan Proposal, the staff recommended to 
the Project Review Committee that the HSA accepted the pro-
posal, subject to the following conditions: 
1. that hospital authority bonds to finance the project be 
at a ten percent rate of interest 
2. that the authority board responsible for issuing bonds 
encompass the entire county and be available to all 
health care facilities in the county. 
3. that the hospital cooperate with the county medical so-
ciety and the HSA in health planning in the future and 
consider consolidating with other providers certain 
hospital services 
4. that 1540 square feet of space be removed from a cen-
ter of health education 
5. that “ten motel type rooms” be eliminated from a center 
for health education 
6. that space allotted to health education programs in a 
center for health education be reduced 
7. that upgrading of CAT scanner software be eliminated 
8. that a thirty bed pod be eliminated and a psychiatric 
unit not be renovated. 
Those eight recommendations can serve as a test of the 
board’s independence. Of the eight, the Project Review Com-
mittee accepted only numbers one and three, and modified 
number one by eliminating the ten percent figure in favor of 
general language which would allow the hospital to fund the 
project at a higher level of interest as long as hospital charges to 
patients would not increase beyond the inflation rate. One can, 
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of course, claim that the conditions were minor compared to the 
overall proposal which the staff recommended the board ap-
prove and which the board did approve. Would not this be evi-
dence that the board followed the lead of the staff? However, 
there was little doubt that Bryan needed to expand. The point of 
contention was the dimensions of the expansion, and it is this 
that the issues raised by the staff addressed. One might also 
claim that the conditions raised by the staff were not particularly 
important to the staff. Comments by the staff, however, believe 
this interpretation. Staff felt, at least prior to the final session of 
the Review Committee, the issues to be quite significant. While 
one has to be cautious in drawing conclusions from a single 
case, it appears that we are left with the conclusion that the 
board acted contrary to the wishes of the staff. 
The conclusion is the same if one examines interview re-
sponses of the board regarding their independence of staff. 
There is some evidence that the board viewed their relationship 
with staff in terms of a division between policy and administra-
tion, i.e., the staff provided information but did not make policy. 
SeNHSA may be unique in that the staff was generally at odds 
with providers. This put the consumer members of the board in 
the enviable position of receiving conflicting information. This 
enhanced their ability to be independent. Responses in our in-
terview sessions indicate that consumers used this advantage to 
exercise independent judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
While it is clear to us that the consumer members of the 
board acted independent of providers and staff, another re-
search question concerns the basis for decision. All but one 
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member of the board voted for the proposal. The lone dissenter 
feared increasing costs would follow acceptance. For those who 
supported the proposal, two factors stand out. First, the project 
was needed. The hospital is 50 years old, and by most standards 
badly in need of renovation. One board member expressed res-
ervations about the total cost, but voted for the proposal be-
cause of what he perceived was a “very serious facilities prob-
lem.” After viewing a three hour presentation given by Bryan of-
ficials and examining Bryan facilities first hand, the need was 
apparent. Second, there was little opposition to the proposal. In 
the early stages, a few residents close to Bryan feared that the 
residential character of the neighborhood would be jeopardized. 
There was also an official from Lincoln General Hospital, (a com-
petitor hospital), who expressed concern primarily with respect 
to cost implications. Both of these concerns seem to have faded 
by April, or at least, they were not brought up again. There is 
some speculation that pressure from the medical community 
helped quiet Lincoln General. Third, there was overwhelming 
support to move forward with the proposal. Not only was the 
medical community strongly supportive, but many patients and 
former patients of Bryan Hospital testified in favor of the pro-
posal.  
Thus, while the project was approved, it was not the result of 
providers overwhelming consumers or consumers backing off. 
Approval followed close scrutiny of the proposal by the Project 
Review Committee, where important questions were raised and 
dealt with, and was based on a clearly demonstrated need. 
Research has shown that consumer participation in health 
planning through HSAs has not been very successful. The gen-
eral conclusion is that consumers are ill equipped to participate 
on an equal footing with providers. The result has been provid-
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ers dominating in health planning much like they have in the 
past. This however, was not the case in SeNHSA. The pattern 
observed for SeNHSA raises doubts about the generality of the 
above conclusion but more importantly holds out the prospect 
for the success of consumer involvement in health planning. 
DISCUSSION 
Why did consumer participation work better in SeNHSA? There 
are four factors that can be pointed to and serve as a basis for 
future research:  
1. The talents and skills of the consumer members; 
2. Consumer members had interest in health care policy be-
fore joining the agency; 
3. Provider members were sympathetic and supportive of 
consumer involvement in health planning; and 
4. the homogenous character of the population in the region 
covered by SeNHSA. 
The consumer members on the board were a talented and 
skillful lot. They were articulate and analytical. Several had pro-
fessional degrees. They were confident and not the type to be 
intimidated by providers. Many had an interest or experience in 
health care that predated their appointment to the board. Re-
cruitment of such types was possible, we believe, because of the 
nature of the selection process. An initial pool of potential ap-
pointees were suggested by civic leaders. Appointments to the 
board were then made by elected public officials. While commu-
nity representation in terms of demographic characteristics may 
have suffered, it was possible to get persons who were willing to 
serve and capable of doing an effective job. A tradeoff must 
necessarily exist between achieving the kind of representation 
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envisioned in the law and effective consumer participation. One 
way to increase the prospects of the latter is to involve commu-
nity leaders. While this typically will mean that some segments of 
the community, the poorer and less educated, might not be a 
part of the decision making process, it does not mean that their 
interests will be ignored. Requirements for independent, effec-
tive consumer participation are best met if they are the focus of 
the selection process. By having consumer represented by effec-
tive spokesmen, all groups have a better change to be repre-
sented. 
SeNHSA also benefited from providers that did not view citi-
zen participation as an unwelcome intrusion. They encouraged 
and welcomed consumer input. Research suggests this pattern 
may be unique. 
Finally, the 17 county region covered by SeNHSA does not 
have the diversity of people or interests that characterize many 
other HSAs. Providers and consumers on the board and in the 
community are in basic agreement on what constitutes quality 
health care and how it should be delivered. The Bryan Hospital 
proposal was consistent with community expectations. The 
principal concern of most residents regarding health care is ac-
cess to the best available care, not the costs of the care. Third 
party payers will in most instances bear most the burdens of in-
creased costs. Bryan officials emphasized that their proposal 
would improve the quality of care provided. They indicated that 
the proposal would obviate the need to travel to Minnesota and 
other places for certain types of care. In sum, officials presented 
the proposal in a way that made it acceptable to all. This elimi-
nated much potential conflict at the start. 
Given the consensus that existed in the community, one 
might ask, was the HSA necessary? Certainly the expansion 
Participation and Independence of Consumers in a HSA 
 16
would have occurred without it and this would have been con-
sistent with community desires. This, however, ignores the 
modifications that were made in the proposal, the challenge to 
providers which made them think through their ideas, and the 
desirability of having individuals involved in the decisions that 
effect them. Without HSA, even minor modifications, such as 
those made in the Bryan proposal, would not have been made. 
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